Cuba ransomware
The FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:
- Compromised 101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.
- Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom payments.
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors have:
- Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges.
- Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003].
- Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001].
- Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472 (also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor and Qbot.
IP Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking.
193.23.244[.]244 | 144.172.83[.]13 | 216.45.55[.]30 |
94.103.9[.]79 | 149.255.35[.]131 | 217.79.43[.]148 |
192.137.101[.]46 | 154.35.175[.]225 | 222.252.53[.]33 |
92.222.172[.]39 | 159.203.70[.]39 | 23.227.198[.]246 |
92.222.172[.]172 | 171.25.193[.]9 | 31.184.192[.]44 |
10.13.102[.]1 | 185.153.199[.]169 | 37.120.247[.]39 |
10.13.102[.]58 | 192.137.100[.]96 | 37.44.253[.]21 |
10.133.78[.]41 | 192.137.100[.]98 | 38.108.119[.]121 |
10.14.100[.]20 | 192.137.101[.]205 | 45.164.21[.]13 |
103.114.163[.]197 | 193.34.167[.]17 | 45.32.229[.]66 |
103.27.203[.]197 | 194.109.206[.]212 | 45.86.162[.]34 |
104.217.8[.]100 | 195.54.160[.]149 | 45.91.83[.]176 |
107.189.10[.]143 | 199.58.81[.]140 | 64.52.169[.]174 |
108.170.31[.]115 | 204.13.164[.]118 | 64.235.39[.]82 |
128.31.0[.]34 | 209.76.253[.]84 | 79.141.169[.]220 |
128.31.0[.]39 | 212.192.241[.]230 | 84.17.52[.]135 |
131.188.40[.]189 | 213.32.39[.]43 | 86.59.21[.]38 |
141.98.87[.]124 | 216.45.55[.]3 |
Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving Payments, as of Late August 2022
Trusted Third-Party Cuba Ransomware IOCs
IP Address | Last Seen | Description |
31.184.194[.]42 | 14.09.2022 | Backup storage |
31.184.199[.]82 | 14.09.2022 | Test-bed |
104.217.8[.]100 | 14.09.2022 | SystemBC Server |
46.17.106[.]230 | 14.09.2022 | RAT Server |
62.210.54[.]235 | 07.2022 | Proxy Server |
185.153.199[.]162 | ||
185.153.199[.]163 | ||
185.153.199[.]164 | ||
185.153.199[.]168 | ||
209.127.187[.]245 | ||
31.44.184[.]100 | ||
31.44.184[.]84 | ||
104.238.134[.]63 | ||
170.39.212[.]69 | ||
69.30.232[.]138 | ||
31.184.198[.]111 | ||
31.184.198[.]90 | ||
31.184.198[.]86 | ||
31.184.198[.]83 | ||
31.184.198[.]85 | ||
31.184.198[.]84 | ||
31.184.198[.]82 | ||
31.184.198[.]80 | ||
31.184.198[.]74 |
magikkey@cock[.]li |
berkberk@cock[.]li |
sonom@cock[.]li |
filebase@cock[.]li |
cloudkey@cock[.]li |
frankstore@cock[.]li |
waterstatus@cock[.]li |
admin@cuba-supp[.]com |
admin@encryption-support[.]com |
cuba_support@exploit[.]im (Jabber) |
URL |
http://babbedidndu.ru/ls5/forum[.]php |
http://fabickng.ru/7/forum[.]php |
http://facabeand.com/sliva/gate[.]php |
http://witorophron.com/ugr/gate[.]php |
http://tycahatit.ru/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://torsketronand.ru/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://toftoflethens.com/ugr/gate[.]php |
http://tinheranter.com/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://thehentoftbet.ru/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://tandugolastsp.com/ls6/gate[.]php |
http://johntotrepwron.com/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://leftthenhispar.ru/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://nagirlstylast.com/ls6/gate[.]php |
http://nastylgilast.com/ls6/gate[.]php |
http://nastylgilast.com/ugr/gate[.]php |
http://ningwitjohnno.ru/ls5/gate[.]php |
http://otinrofha.ru/ls4/gate[.]php |
http://reninparwil.com/ls5/gate[.]php |

Blogger at www.systemtek.co.uk